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This paper examines the impact of the Big Three (i.e. Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and
Fitch) announcements on sovereign bond indexes. Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have
frequently been accused by the press and political leaders for deepening the financial
crisis, by surprising the market with rating downgrades and/or negative outlooks of
sovereign debts (Boninghausen and Zabel, Journal of International Finance and Money
2015). The idea is that if assessment models used by CRAs employ available informa-
tion better than the market does, rating announcements provide “new” information
(Cavallo et al., http://web.mit.edu/rigobon/www/Robertos_Web_Page/int_-_credrate.
html. 2008). But, CRAs could also use this power to drive the market up or down
and many downgrades in the Eurozone were considered “destabilizing” and
“excessive,” feeding belief in a conspiracy theory. On the other hand, many financial
economists believe that the market is relatively efficient and assessment of sovereign
debts cannot surprise financial investors. This is due to the absence of asymmetric
information between the market and CRAs. Differently from private companies, all the
information used in assessing sovereign debts are publicly available and assigned free
of charge by at least two major CRAs. Thus efficient markets price this information
immediately after news occurs (Hirsch and Bannier, https://www.ifk-cfs.de/fileadmin/
downloads/publications/wp/08_02.pdf. 2007). It implies that CRAs simply “certify”
what the market has priced already and are not able to drive the market as suggested by
conspiracy theory.
We employ an event-study methodology to a sample of 43 bond indexes from
Bloomberg over the period 1962 to 2013 to test if the market anticipates the news, or if
CRAs can shock the financial market with their rating announcements. In particular, we
propose four separate hypotheses. The first hypothesis (H1) tests for the overall
significance of announcements by CRAs. The second hypothesis (H2) checks
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separately the impact of negative and positive announcements. To investigate whether
the market efficiency hypothesis and/or conspiracy theory holds (H3), we split the event
windows in two and test the impact of announcements in the pre- and post-event
window. Our last hypothesis (H4) examines the market efficiency hypothesis and
conspiracy theory individually for each CRA.
Our empirical specification consists of a parsimonious capital asset pricing (CAP)-
like model for bonds derived from the yield curve. We rely on bond indexes as they
determine the annual interest rate rolling over bonds continuously when they mature.
We calculate the bond index price from yield to maturity and obtain a time series with
features similar to equity prices. Then, we compute the daily rate of return on bond
index prices, the dependent variable used in our CAP-like model. As there is no market
bond index to use as an independent variable, we can build the CAP-like model
exploiting the term structure of interest rates. The impact should be similar for positive
and negative announcements in the sense that short-term reactions should be more
(positively and negatively) intense than long-term ones. Basically, this is a CAP model
where we replace equity returns with short-term bond index returns and market returns
with long-term bond index returns, hence the term ‘CAP-like’ model. As risk increases
with maturity, we expect a beta lower than one because of the investors’ preference for
liquidity.
We find that CRAs announcements affect sovereign bond returns. The largest
reaction is after a negative announcement, supporting conspiracy theory. Positive
announcements are significant before the event, a pattern in line with the market
efficiency hypothesis, but their effect is broadly only one-third the size of negative
post-event announcements. Fitch and Moody’s announcements are coherent with
conspiracy theory, whereas the market is able to anticipate rating assessments issued
by Standard & Poor’s. We apply different estimators to control for country and day
effects because they could produce biased test statistics. Our results are robust to
different samples, subperiods, window sizes, specifications and variable definitions.
The policy implication of our results is that the regulator/supervisor should reduce the
power attributed to ratings in accounting standards, and not assign an excessively
influential role to these agencies. This is particularly true for the Eurozone. Its members
are negatively affected by rating announcements, whereas important financial markets,
such as the United States, United Kingdom, Japan and Switzerland, seem to avoid the
negative effects of rating assessments. Our paper contributes to the exiting literature on
CRAs in three ways: (i) we develop a parsimonious and simple CAP-like model for
bonds, (ii) we develop a structured framework for testing hypotheses on CRAs’
announcements, (iii) we provide evidence in favour of conspiracy theory.
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